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Trinity College Dublin
Abstract: This paper investigates the sources of the extremely high level of owner occupation in
Ireland. After using census data to explore the evolution of this phenomenon, the paper makes a
cross-country comparison of owner occupation within the EU-15. Explanations are found  for the
high level of owner occupation that go beyond fiscal privilege to include wider microeconomic
factors, as well as historical factors. Within the EU-15, the Irish housing stock is exceptional not




reland has long experienced a remarkably high level of owner occupation of
residential property, both absolutely and relative to neighbouring countries.
According to the first census after the second world war, 52.7 per cent of
private dwellings were owner occupied in 1946.1 That approximates to the
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1 To avoid cumbersome terminology, the terms ‘houses’ and ‘housing’ will generally be used as
synonymous with dwellings of all types, where precision is unimportant. However, in relation to
census data, the distinction between ‘housing units’ and ‘dwellings’ is important, in that a housing
unit may contain more than one dwelling, so that in aggregate the number of housing units is
always less than the number of dwellings. Detailed published tabulations in the censuses of 1946,
1961 and 2002 were based on dwellings; those in 1971 were based on housing units; and those in
1981 and 1991 were based on both categories. The data presented for dwellings for 1971 are based
on special tabulations provided by the CSO, or on published data after adjustment by the author.
The figures for Ireland quoted in this paragraph and used as the basis for Figure 1. are drawn
from successive editions of the Census, 1946, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, 2002. Data for the rest of the
EU are drawn from Housing Statistics in the European Union 2004.current rates of owner occupation in Denmark, France, Netherlands and
Austria, which were in the range 53 per cent to 58 per cent in 2001-2003, and
comfortably exceeds the current rate for Germany, which was 45 per cent in
2002 excluding the former DDR.2 After 1946, successive Irish censuses
recorded increases in owner occupation up to 1991 when the proportion
reached 79.2 per cent. A small reduction to 77.4 per cent was recorded in the
intercensal period 1991-2002, although the absolute number of owner-
occupied dwellings grew by 22.6 per cent. Within the EU-15,3 Ireland’s
proportion of owner occupation in 2001-2003 was exceeded only by the
Spanish figure of 82 per cent. Luxembourg was the median country, at 67 per
cent.
The main trends in tenure shares in Ireland since 1946 are displayed in
Figure 1, and recent comparisons with the rest of the EU are drawn in Figure
2.
Figure 1: Household Tenure Shares Per Cent: Ireland, Private Dwellings,
1946–2002
The essence of this is widely appreciated among economists, journalists
and other commentators, and it has often been used as the starting-point for
critical analysis and comment on Irish housing policy, on the interaction of
fiscal policy with the housing market, and on the preferences and actions of
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2 The figure for the former DDR was 34 per cent.
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%
Source: Census, 1946 to 2002. Data for 1971 are from special tabulations supplied  by the CSO.individual house purchasers and occupiers. Some quotations illustrate this
point; they are also noteworthy in illustrating how comment on Irish tenure
habits frequently includes normative judgements:
Excessive focus on promoting owner occupation [via the fiscal system]
encourages owners to acquire accommodation in excess of their needs...
(Memery 2000, p. vii.)
Why is it that Irish people in such numbers seek to own their own
homes? They are prepared to take on huge mortgages, the repayments on
which may reduce greatly their discretionary income … Elsewhere … It is
common to rent...Continentals, as a consequence, often enjoy a better
lifestyle. (The Irish Times, leader, 8 March 1997, p. 15.)
We consider that owner occupation is a desirable social goal...However,
the [present tax system] has resulted in an undue proportion of
investment in certain types of housing to the detriment of more productive
uses. Demand has in many cases been increased above real needs...It has
also led to over investment and trading-up in house property and a waste
of scarce resources... (Commission on Taxation, 1982, p. 138.)
This rest of this paper attempts to answer the following questions: what
are the sources of Ireland’s rate of owner occupation? and has a high rate of
owner occupation resulted in an excessively large housing stock? These issues
are taken up in turn in Sections II and III, and conclusions are drawn in
Section IV. 
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Figure 2: Owner-Occupied Dwellings as Per Cent of Total Housing Stock:
EU-15, 2001–2003a
a Source: Housing Statistics in the European Union. Data for 2003 except: DE, LU, BE, EL,
Ireland 2002; SE, PT 2001. II TENURE CHOICES
2.1 Public Policy
At least two elements of public policy bear heavily on tenure choices:
namely, fiscal incentives, and local authority tenant-purchase schemes.
Over the years, the fiscal system has favoured house-purchase by way of
various tax provisions and, between 1977 and 2002, cash grants to first-time
buyers. Currently, buyers of new houses are eligible for relief of stamp duty,4
subject to certain restrictions. In the case of second-hand properties purchased
by first-time buyers, lower rates of duty applied before 2005 when the price
was below a specified limit; after the 2005 budget, there has been complete
exemption, again subject to the purchase price falling below a specified limit.
From the tax year 1969-70, when Schedule A income tax was abolished,
the imputed rent from owner-occupied dwellings has not been taxed, and from
that date until 1974,5 house-purchasers were treated more advantageously
under the income tax code than at any other time. First, before 1974 all loan
interest was deductible at the taxpayer’s marginal rate of income tax, and it
was only from 1974 onwards that any restriction was placed on deductibility
of interest payments. Second, during the period 1969-70 to 1974, the
maximum marginal rate of tax, which was then the maximum rate at which
interest payments could be relieved, was 80 per cent. Since 1974, various cash
limits have been placed on the interest deduction, while since 1975 the top
marginal rate has fallen in stages to reach 42 per cent in 2001, with a further
reduction to 41 per cent announced in the budget speech in December 2006.
The deduction attracted relief at the taxpayer’s marginal rate up to the tax
year 1993-4, while from 1997-8 the relief has been entirely at the standard
rate (currently 20 per cent) for all taxpayers.6 Under current legislation, first-
time buyers are allowed a larger deduction for the first five years.
Ireland is not exceptional among the EU-15 in its fiscal treatment of home-
ownership or purchase. It is among the majority in not taxing owner occupiers
on the imputed rental-value of their properties, and also in allowing some
degree of deductibility of mortgage interest for income tax purposes. Moreover,
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4 This is a tax levied on the value of residential (and other) property at point of sale. Stamp duty
on residential property is payable by the purchaser. The rate of duty rises with the sale-price, up
to a maximum rate, and the applicable rate applies to the entire value.
5 Information on the tax system was obtained from successive editions of the Annual Reports and
Statistical Reports of The Revenue Commissioners, and also from the annual Budget. 
6 Until 1981, the income tax code did not distinguish at all between housing-related debt and other
personal debt; since 1985 only interest payments on the former have been deductible.the rate of VAT on new dwellings, at 131⁄2 per cent, is at or close to the median
value in a range of zero to 25 per cent.7
As regards housing subsidies as a share of GDP, Ireland at 0.10 per cent
is second from lowest in a range of 0.1 per cent to 1.9 per cent among twelve
countries for which EU-15 data are available.8 This information should be
interpreted with caution, because of the likelihood of inconsistency between
the self-reported data from different countries, but it does not lend support to
any belief that the fiscal system in Ireland is exceptionally generous in its
treatment of house-purchase and ownership.
For many years, sitting tenants of local authorities have had the option of
buying their dwellings. Various types of incentive have been offered, and the
cumulative total of purchases up to 1987 was more than 180,000 (Blackwell,
1988, p. 173). From 1988 until December 2005, a further 53,000 sales were
completed, compared with approximately the same number of dwellings newly
constructed for local authorities or acquired by them during the same period.
(Annual/Quarterly Housing Statistics Bulletin.)
In contrast to the fiscal treatment of home ownership, rent payments have
attracted only a small level of tax relief. The relief was introduced in 1982 for
persons over fifty-five only, and since 1995 then it has been available to all
tenants. In 2006, the Rent Tax Credits ranged from maxima of €330 for single
persons under fifty-five to €1,320 for married or widowed persons over fifty-
five. Norris and Winston (2005, p. 66) state that “the relief is minimal when
rent levels are considered”, and report an estimate by the Commission on the
Private Rented Residential Sector that in 2000-2001 the average relief was
worth €5 per week.
These aspects of public policy, while important, do not fully explain the
high rate of owner occupation. For a complete explanation we must look at the
microeconomics of the tenure-choice decision, including life-cycle and portfolio
considerations, and also at historical factors.
2.2 The Microeconomics of the Tenure-Choice Decision
Consider an individual’s tenure choice concerning a given dwelling, where
the property may be purchased, or alternatively rented from a private-sector
landlord. Suppose that the landlord’s required annual compound rate of return
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7 The minority where imputed rent is taxed consists of Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands; the minority in which interest is non-deductible consists of France,
Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom, with no information available for Austria. See Housing
Statistics in the European Union 2004, Table 4.14, which also records details of VAT rates on new
dwellings.
8 Housing Statistics in the European Union 2004, Table 5.4. Data are absent for Austria, Italy,
United Kingdom.on residential property is R, and that R is also the rate of interest on property-
related debt. For simplicity we ignore maintenance costs and depreciation,
and initially we ignore taxes. 
Assume that landlords, tenants and purchasers have a time-horizon T
with homogeneous expectations, and that V0 and VT  are the initial and
expected terminal market values of the property. The annual average growth
rate of prices expected by all parties is c, so that that VT = V0ecT, and we
assume that the expectation V(t) at any interim date t satisfies V(t) = V0ect.
Suppose that at any date t, the minimum or “reservation” rent ρ(t) at which
the property will be let satisfies the condition that the expected present value
of the potential cash-flows (rents plus terminal value) equals the current
market value. We define the rate of reservation rent λ by ρ(t) = λV(t). We may
easily show that λ = R – c for a one-period time horizon, and for longer horizons
we also have λ = R – c if we restrict λ to be constant. Formal derivations of this
and subsequent expressions in this section are set out in Appendix A.
Now consider a buyer. On each €1 worth of the property that is currently
debt-financed, he pays annual interest €R currently; to the extent that he
holds equity in the property, each €1 of equity imposes an opportunity cost of
€R currently. However, he expects that in either case each €1 of property
value will grow at the rate c per annum. Thus the net annual cost per €1 after
expected capital appreciation is R – c. This is the user cost of housing,9 and in
this case it equals λ, the rate of reservation rent. In long-run competitive
equilibrium where rents equal reservation levels, and ignoring taxes, we have:
market rent/V = λ = R − c = user cost: the individual will then be indifferent
between renting and buying, assuming that purchased and rented property
are regarded as perfect substitutes.10
The equilibrium condition λ+ c = R has a simple interpretation. If a renter
actually succeeds in obtaining the reservation rent, then the condition λ+ c =
R means that rent plus capital appreciation just equals the interest rate R on
property-related debt, i.e. the required rate of return on housing.
Alternatively, from an owner occupier’s perspective, R is the cost of debt
finance, or the opportunity cost of equity in housing, while R−c is the net cost
after capital appreciation. The condition R − c = λ states simply that this net
cost should equal the cost of renting housing services in equilibrium, where
again the reservation rent λ is the actual rent also. Taxes complicate the
picture, and distort it if landlords and owner occupiers face different tax
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9 Strictly, user cost should also include maintenance and depreciation costs. These are ignored
here, as they are likely to be very small in relation to house prices.
10 From this point it will be convenient to treat the term “reservation rent” as synonymous with
the rate of reservation rent, i.e. relative to the price of the property.schedules. In what follows, the expressions for reservation rent and user cost
become more complicated, but their interpretation remains the same.
As matters stand in Ireland, landlords’ rents are taxed, unlike owner
occupiers’ imputed rental income; interest paid is allowed as a deduction for
tax purposes in either case, subject to certain restrictions in the case of owner
occupiers; interest received (i.e. the opportunity cost of equity in property) is
taxed; and finally, taxes are levied on capital gains by landlords but not on
sales of primary residences, including a site of up to one acre, by owner
occupiers.
Putting all this together, using ty and tc to denote the marginal rates of
income and capital gains taxes respectively, and assuming that ty has the
same value in all circumstances, the reservation rent is R − c(1 − tc)/(1 − ty),
which would also be the user cost if owner occupiers paid income tax on
imputed rent (net of interest) and were liable to tax on capital gains. However,
in the absence of those two taxes, the user cost is (1 − ty)R − c, where ty is the
rate of income tax at which interest payments are relieved or investment
income is taxed.
In Ireland, mortgage interest is relieved at the 20 per cent tax rate, subject
to an annual cap on the total interest payment that may be relieved. In 2005,
the cap for a married couple was €8,000 if they were first-time buyers or
€5,080 otherwise, which corresponded to outstanding mortgages of about
€230,000 or €150,000 respectively, at a time when the average price of a new
house was about €276,000. Clearly, for many households in 2005, as also in
other years, not all interest payments would have been relieved. In effect, the
average €1 of debt interest is relieved at less than the standard 20 per cent
tax rate, so that (1 − 0.2)R − c is a lower bound for user cost, in the case of debt-
financed owner occupation, while R − c is an upper bound. R − c is the user cost
in the case of a zero marginal tax rate, and it is also the (marginal) user cost
where a taxpaying purchaser is above the limit for interest relief. In the case
of equity held in owner-occupied property, the expression for user cost is the
same, but ty becomes the individual’s marginal tax rate on investment income.
The upper bound on user cost is still R−c, corresponding to the case where no
tax would arise: for example, a low-income elderly couple inhabiting a low-
value property, who fall below the income-tax exemption limit. However, the
lower bound is now (1 −  0.42)R  −  c, corresponding to the case where all
investment income is taxed at the higher marginal rate of 42 per cent.11
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11 In 2006, falling to 41 per cent in 2007. Note that many taxpayers are also subject to the Health
Levy on their gross investment incomes; for them, this has the effect of increasing the marginal
tax rate by 2 per cent up to 2006, and by either 2 per cent or 2.5 per cent, depending on income
level, from 2007. PRSI is not relevant in this context.If tc = ty the expression for reservation rent becomes R − c, in which case
we conclude that the tax system certainly drives user cost below reservation
rent levels. In Ireland the current value of tc is 0.2, which is also the value of
the standard rate of income tax, while the rate of corporation tax applied to
rental income is 0.25.12 Thus for individual landlords paying tax at the
standard rate, reservation rent is R−c, and certainly exceeds user cost;
however for landlords paying income tax at the higher marginal rate, or for
corporate landlords paying corporation tax, reservation rent is below R−c,
because (1 −  tc)/(1  −  ty)  >  1. It may be larger or smaller than user cost
depending on the values of R, c, tc and ty.
From April 1998 until December 2001, interest on property loans was not
allowed as a deduction from rental income for tax purposes, and during that
period, rates of reservation rent were in consequence higher than they would
otherwise have been (see Appendix, equation (A2)).
2.3 User Cost and Reservation Rent Data and their Time-Series Properties
Time series for reservation rent and user cost (all ex post) are displayed in
Figure 3. These data are expressed in nominal terms: we shall be concerned
with the relative magnitudes of user cost, reservation rent, and the rate of
market rent, and there is nothing to be gained by deflating their nominal
values. 
The calculations for Figure 3 are based on data for the interest rate and
the annual rate of growth of house prices. Monthly data from 1970 for the
average interest rate on variable-rate mortgages were obtained from the
Central Bank of Ireland and converted into annual averages, and the annual
rates of house-price growth were calculated from the annual average data for
house prices that are published in the Department of the Environment’s
Housing Statistics Bulletin and its predecessors13 for the entire country and
all lending agencies. New house prices were used, because that series covers a
longer span than the series for second-hand properties. 
Of course, decisions are based on expectations rather than on ex post data,
which suggests that we might attempt to estimate an autoregressive
expectations mechanism. Applying an Augmented Dickey-Fuller test to each of
the annual user cost and reservation rent series (in levels), 1970-2005, we
cannot reject the unit root hypotheses in any case. For example the ADF
statistic is −1.7272 for user cost at the top marginal tax rate, compared with a
95 per cent critical value of −2.9528, and the results for the other series are
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12 Information concerning corporation tax has been obtained from the Irish Taxation Institute.
13 House Purchase Loans by Building Societies Assurance Companies and Local Authorities,
December 1969 and February 1970, and Quarterly Bulletin of Housing Statistics, from 1970, first
quarter. Both were published by the Department of Local Government.very similar. If there is indeed a unit root, then the corresponding series is
nonstationary. At the same time, there is no evidence of a unit root in the
differenced data. This suggests that we should explore the possibility of a
relationship in the lagged differences. For each series, regressions were then
run between the first differences and their lagged values, at various lag-
lengths, but in no case could a significant relationship be found. From this we
conclude that each series follows a random walk, so that the best forecast for
the next period is the current value. We shall henceforth take this to be the
case for the time-series that are analysed in this paper. The small sample size
limits the power of the ADF test, but at the same time limits the scope for
carrying out more sophisticated time-series analysis.
2.4 Analysis of User Cost and Reservation Rents
For the most part, the series that are displayed in Figure 3 evolve along
approximately a common path, so that the fact that they are hard to
distinguish visually is of little consequence. The user cost series at a zero tax
rate is the upper bound to actual user cost in any given instance, while the
series at the maximum tax rate is the lower bound. Reservation rent at the
maximum marginal rate of income tax is a clear outlier from the other series
during 1970 to 1985 when the top marginal rate of income tax was at or above
60 per cent.
Much recent experience in Ireland has been of disequilibrium with excess
demand for housing. In these circumstances market rents exceed the
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%
User cost, zero tax rate (b)
Reservation rent, standard tax rate
User cost, maximum tax rate (c)
Reservation rent, maximum tax rate
Figure 3: Reservation Rent and User Cost,a 1970-2005
Notes: (a) All in nominal terms: see text.         
(b) Applies at the margin to a mortgagor who has exhausted the allowable interest relief. 
(c) Applies to equity in property for a higher-rate taxpayer.reservation rent, and in fact the ex post value of the latter was negative for
most of the period 1970-2004. Reservation rent was positive in only ten out of
thirty-six years when computed at the standard rate of income tax, and for
seven years at the top marginal rate. Moreover, these are over-estimates of
reservation rent to the extent that landlords have had access to tax-shelters
such as the Section 23 provisions. When reservation rent has been negative,
user cost has usually been negative also, and consequently has been below the
market rent. During the most recent ten years 1996-2005, the user cost of an
average new house was in the range [−15.4 per cent, −2.6 per cent], ignoring
taxes, or [−18.7 per cent, −4.9 per cent] in the case of owner’s equity where
investment income is taxed at the top marginal rate. Over the entire period
1970 to 2005, user cost at a zero tax rate had a mean of −2.2 per cent and was
positive in only thirteen of thirty-six years, while at the standard tax-rate the
mean was −5.2 per cent with positive values in ten years. When the calculation
is repeated with the standard rate of tax replaced by the maximum allowable
rate for mortgage interest relief,14 or by the top marginal rate, then user cost
is found to have been positive in only eight years. The conclusion from these
data is that for most of the time since 1970, with user cost usually negative,
purchase and ownership has certainly been far more attractive than renting,
given that rents must be positive. In the less common periods of positive user
cost, the ranking depends on the relative magnitudes of user cost versus the
market rate of rent. 
A first response to these data might be that they are a consequence of the
fiscally privileged position of house owners and purchasers. However, under a
neutral fiscal system, user cost would equal reservation rent. For twenty-six
years during 1970-2005 this was below user cost for higher-rate taxpayers, so
fiscal neutrality would have involved a lower user cost for them for most of the
time; even in years when user cost was below reservation rent the gap was
small, with an average of 1.6 per centage points in those years. For standard
rate taxpayers, user cost was below reservation rent for most of the time
(twenty-three years), but again the gap was small with a similar average
value. However, before conclusions from these comparisons are pushed too far
it must be understood that, under a neutral tax regime, the growth of property
prices would very likely be slower, with the implication of a higher user cost.
In fact this purely financial analysis is incomplete. First, it describes the
alternatives at the point of tenure decision. However as time passes, debt-
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14 I.e. the top marginal rate up to the tax year 1993-94 (by which date the income-tax system
provided for only a single rate above the standard rate), and the standard rate from 1997-98. In
the transition years, higher-rate taxpayers were permitted to deduct at a weighted average of the
standard rate and the higher rate, the weights being (1⁄4, 3⁄4), (1⁄2, 1⁄2) and (3⁄4, 1⁄4), respectively, in
the three successive years.service costs for buyers continue to relate to the original purchase price
whereas rents generally relate to current prices or at least to lagged prices.
This makes purchase significantly more attractive than renting, unless prices
fall.
Secondly, the analysis ignores risk. Some risks make renting more
attractive than purchase - for example, the risk of falling property prices and
“negative equity”; perhaps also the risk of becoming unemployed during a
property slump while encumbered with mortgage debt; and finally, interest-
rate risk, although the availability of fixed-rate mortgages mitigates this.
However, for many households these risks may be discounted, while renting in
the private sector raises other risks that may exclude it as a long-term option.
When purchase is planned to take place eventually and prices are rising, then
delaying purchase will be seen as risky. Moreover, renting exposes the
household to other risks: of an unsatisfactory landlord, and of the possibilities
of loss of tenancy and of unpredictable periodic rent increases.
2.5 Purchase versus Renting: Life-Cycle Considerations
Differences in the perceived risk attached to each option are an aspect of
a wider consideration: at the point of tenure decision, rented and purchased
housing are unlikely to be viewed always as perfect substitutes, with the
choice being governed only by financial considerations. Some households may
value the flexibility of renting, with its potential for mobility. Others, at a
point in the life-cycle where decisions are being made for the long term, may
reject renting because of the limits that it imposes on a household’s control
over its own physical surroundings. 
Disposable income tends to rise from the early through the middle years
of the lifecycle of the typical household, and for this reason and also for others
connected with changing family circumstances, we expect many households to
wish to move away from renting towards owner occupation as time progresses.
Special tabulations of census data reveal a strong relationship between the
age of the head of household (or “reference person” in census terminology) and
the proportions of households in each tenure category. Figure 4 displays data
for 2002, but the picture was similar in 1971, 1981 and 1991. We assume that
the age of the “reference person” in the census data is a good proxy for the
position of the household in the lifecycle. In the 20-24 age-group, fewer than
30 per cent are owner occupiers and more than 70 per cent are renters. As we
move across the age spectrum, the proportion of owner occupiers rises and
that of renters falls, until we reach the age-group 70-74, after which the
movement reverses very slightly. It certainly appears, therefore, that there is
a typical life-cycle dimension to the tenure decision, to which most households
adhere.
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this conclusion. According to Table 8 of the Housing and Households report for
the 3rd quarter of 1998, the proportion of owner occupiers rises steeply across
the age-spectrum of the reference person up to age 64, and then reaches a
plateau, while the proportion of renters falls to a corresponding plateau.15
According to the special census tabulations, there has been a rise recently
in the age of the reference-person beyond which the tenure-pattern stabilises,
which is visible graphically when tenure-pattern is plotted against age-group.
A formal investigation involves computing the variability (standard deviation)
of tenure-shares among age cohorts whose age of reference person exceeds a
given threshold: by choosing successively larger values of threshold, we
establish a value beyond which the variability stabilises. In the census of
1971, 1981 and 1991, this occurred before age 54, whereas in 2002 the
plateaux for tenure-shares were only approached once the 60-64 cohort was
reached. Table 1 shows that from age 60 there is very little variability across
the age-groups in any of the four sets of census data, as measured by the
standard deviation of the tenure-group shares; the table also shows that the
plateau-value for the share of owner occupation has been steadily rising, from
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15 The most recent QNHS Housing Module was 2003, third quarter. However, it contains no data
on the age-profile of the different tenure-categories.
Figure 4: Proportions of Owner-Occupied and Rented Dwellings,a Classified by












20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80-84 >84
Age-group of reference person
%
Owner occupied 2002 Rented 2002
Source: CSO, special tabulation of 2002 Census.
Note: a excluding dwellings “occupied rent-free” or “not stated”. Of the remaining 95.4 per cent,
81.2 per cent were owner occupied, and 18.8 per cent were rented.75.5 per cent among those aged 60+ in 1971 to 91.2 per cent in 2002.
There are two other illuminating ways of analysing these data. First, we
may look at how the total numbers in each tenure-group are distributed across
the age-spectrum, and compare these distributions with the population of all
reference persons in the “owner occupied” and “rented” categories. We find
that, while owner occupiers are distributed much like the defined population,
renters are concentrated in the younger age-groups, particularly between 20
and thirty-four years. In 2002, 48 per cent of renters were in that age-cohort,
compared with 21 per cent of the defined population, and 15 per cent of owner
occupiers. This concentration was visible in earlier years, but it has been
increasing.
Second, given the availability of data since 1971, we may track the
progress of different cohorts as they age, and Table 2 does this. Reading the
table vertically, it is clear that in every cohort, as we track it through
successive censuses, the proportion of owner occupiers rises and thus the
proportion of renters falls. For example, 63 per cent of the 30-34 age-cohort
were owner occupiers in 1971, and ten years later, 83 per cent of the same
cohort (now aged 40-44) were owner occupiers in 1981. By 1991 the value for
this group was 88 per cent, and by 2002, 91 per cent.
2.6 Purchase Versus Renting: Portfolio Considerations
The decision whether to purchase or rent is partly a portfolio decision,
concerning the form in which household assets should be held, and to this we
now turn.16
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Table 1: Mean and Standard Deviation of Tenure Shares of 60+ Age-Groupsa
Owner Occupiers:b Renters:b Both Groups:c
Mean Share Mean Share Standard Deviation
% % of Shares
%
1971 75.5 24.5 1.2
1981 81.5 18.5 1.2
1991 86.7 13.3 1.1
2002 91.2 8.8 0.4
Source: Central Statistics Office, special tabulations of census data.
Notes: 
a The six groups are 60-64, 65-69, 70-74, 75-79, 80-84, greater than 84. These relate to the age of
the “reference person”.
b The categories “occupied rent-free” and “not stated” have been excluded.
c The proportions owning and renting sum to unity in each age group, so the standard deviations
of the two proportions are identical, in any year.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































→The total return on property is the capital appreciation plus rental income,
whether actual or imputed. Let c, R, m and RA be the expectations of the
annual rates of, respectively: the appreciation of house prices; the required
return on property loans; the market rental rate on property; and the return
on an alternative (non-property) asset. Income is taxed at the rate ty, but
housing gains and imputed rents are untaxed. Consider an owner occupier
who owns a portion worth €E of a property that has a market value V0, with
the balance being debt-financed. The excess return of owning over renting is:
[m − ((1 − ty)R − c)]V0 − (1 − ty)[RA− R]E,
or as a rate of return on the total investment V0,
[m − ((1 − ty)R − c)] − (1− ty)[RA− R]E/V0.17
The term (1 − ty)R − c is the user cost u2, as discussed in section 2.2.18
Clearly, if RA= R, then ownership dominates renting from a financial
perspective, if market rent m exceeds user cost, as has been the case for much
of the recent past. If RA  R, then the comparison must be modified to take
account of the difference in the returns on the two assets and the level of
financial gearing E/V0. In the following, we explore the case where E = V0, so
that the excess return of owning over renting is: m + c − (1 − ty)RA. By
assuming also that ty = 0, we focus on the most favourable condition for
renting.
Decisions are based on the expected returns on the alternative assets,
whereas data are only available ex post. However, these data are relevant both
as an illustration of historic experience and also because at the microeconomic
level households are likely to use past experience as an input to decisions for
the future.
The Housing Statistics Bulletin and its predecessors provide time-series of
house prices. The series for new houses starts in the second calendar quarter
of 1968, while the series for second-hand houses starts in 1975, and since those
dates each annual series has recorded only one fall in the country-wide
average, in 1986-87. The annual average rate of growth of new house prices,
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17 It is assumed that a uniform marginal income tax rate applies to the relief of interest payments
for the purchaser, and to the taxing of the renter’s investment income. Currently, interest on bank
deposits is subject to DIRT at 20 per cent, and not to higher-rate tax, and for certain other
categories of investment income the total tax obligation is a withholding tax of 23 per cent.
Mortgage interest payments are relieved at the 20 per cent rate, subject to certain restrictions.
For simplicity these comparisons ignore the small tax credits that are available to private renters.
18 See derivation in Appendix A, equation (A4).1970-2005, was 10.9 per cent, with a standard deviation of 7.5 per cent.19 We
also need information on rent levels in the private sector, for which the sources
are successive Census reports, the Quarterly National Household Survey,
Housing Module, 2003-III, all of which contain data for weekly rents, and
Watson and Williams (2003), which contains data for monthly rents. 
Up to 1971, census data on rents did not discriminate between local
authority and private lettings, and are therefore not usable here. Excluding
local authority lettings, weighted average annual rents computed from 1981
census data were 2.6 per cent of average new house prices (entire country) for
the second quarter of 1981, as set out in the Housing Statistics Bulletin, and
the equivalent figures for April 1991 and April 2002 are 4.1 per cent and 4.2
per cent respectively. Data limitations in 1981 and 1991 only permit this
calculation as an average for all let dwellings, but more extensive data for
2002 allow us to calculate a value of 4.3 per cent for annual rent/capital value
for purpose-built flats. If we assume that the 1981 data applied as far back as
1969, then these data imply an average rental rate of about 3.5 per cent per
annum since then. 
Using the Quarterly National Household Survey for 2003-III, the figure for
the average annual rate of rent relative to new house prices is 4.1 per cent,
and relative to new apartment prices the rate is 3.8 per cent. Finally, the
median value for monthly private-sector rents reported in Watson and
Williams represents an annual return of 3.9 per cent on average new house
prices in 2001-2002. In the following we shall assume that annual residential
rents on privately-rented dwellings have stood at 4 per cent of house prices, so
that the overall return is (1 + c)(1.04) − 1, where c is the growth rate of house
prices. By doing no more than this we should in effect be taking the rental rate
to be riskless, and the standard deviation of the overall return series would be
that of the price-change series multipled by 1.04. We need to allow properly for
the risk associated with rents, and a footnote to Table 3 explains how this is
done, using a procedure based on the Privately Owned Rent Index. That index
has been published by the Central Statistics Office from November 1975, and
is a component of the Consumer Price Index.
Table 3 compares returns on property and other assets.20 The latter are
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19 The first full year of the price series for new houses was 1969, but 1970 is used as the initial
year in this computation for consistency with data shown elsewhere in this paper.
20 As elsewhere in this paper, no attempt is made to present estimates of expectations from these
data. The price-change data has similar properties to those for user cost and reservation rents. We
cannot reject the unit root hypothesis for the data in levels, but while we can reject it for the
differenced series, it is not possible to find a significant autoregressive relationship in that series
using various lag lengths. In contrast for the series for returns on equity, bonds and commercial
property, the unit root hypothesis is rejected. For equity and bonds it is not possible to find
significant autoregressive relationships. Only in the case of commercial property is there some
evidence of an autoregressive relationship, at lag length one.drawn from Whelan (undated) and also from data supplied privately to the
author by Dr Whelan. If we credit owner occupiers only with capital
appreciation, then over the period 1970-2003 financial assets, in particular
equities, have shown a greater return but with a correspondingly greater
volatility and risk. However, when imputed rents are included, as they should
be, we see in Table 3 that owner-occupied housing has delivered an annual
average nominal return very close to that on equities but at less than one-
third of the risk, that is, at a standard deviation of 8 per cent to 10 per cent,
versus 34.5 per cent in the case of equities. Alternatively, the mean return has
been close to that on long gilts, at less than two-thirds the risk. Moreover, the
tabulated returns on equities, bonds and commercial property are all gross of
income and capital gains taxes. 
Some confirmation of our estimate of risk and return on residential
property is furnished by their proximity to the estimates for commercial
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Table 3: Annual Average Pre-tax Geometric Mean Return and Volatility of
Return: Various Assets, 1970−2003
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Residential Residential Commercial Equities Long 





%% % % %
Geometric mean,
nominal annual 
return: 10.9 15.3 16.1 14.9 11.5
Standard deviation,
annual returns: 7.7 8.0 to 10.0* 12.7 34.5 16.5
Sources: quarterly and annual Housing Statistics Bulletins for new house prices; for other data:
Whelan (undated, and personal communication). 
Notes: (a) is based on annual average prices of new houses, all area. In (b) the rental rate is
estimated at 4 per cent of the price, as discussed in the text, and the mean is  the value in (a)
adjusted appropriately. The data for commercial property are for 1970-2000. All the tabulated
values are nominal and pre-tax.
* When the annual return on residential property is computed by compounding the growth in
prices by a flat 4 per cent per annum rental return then the standard deviation rises from 7.7%
to 8.0%. Alternatively, and to allow explicitly for the riskiness of the rental return, we derive a
rental return series by using the Privately Owned Rent Index in combination with the average
rent in 2003 from the Quarterly National Household Survey, along with house-price data. This is
then combined with the series for the growth in house prices, and the standard deviation of this
annual series, 1976-2005, is 10.0%. If average rents from the 1981 census replace the 2003 QNHS
figure, the standard deviation is 8.5%.property. Comparisons such as these suggest that, for any rational household,
the risk-return profile of housing is likely to have been seen as far more
attractive than that of financial assets, the more so in view of the fact that
investment income and capital gains are exposed to taxation while owner
occupation is not. Related considerations support this: for example, the
prospect of exposure to market rents during retirement is likely to be seen 
as less attractive than ownership of a house, with any mortgage paid off
earlier, particularly in view of the risks attached to equity markets and
pension funds.
Alternative official data on rents paid to private landlords are contained
in the monthly Privately Owned Rent Index. According to this, the growth of
rents was considerably slower than is suggested by census data. In the
intercensal periods 1981-1991 and 1991-2002, the census average rose by 261
per cent and 314 per cent, respectively, while the Rent Index rose by only 73
per cent and 74 per cent.21 It is not entirely clear why there is such a disparity,
but the main reason is likely to be the fact that during the early to mid 1990s
there were significant methodological changes in the collection of rents data
for the index.22 However, if we assume that the most recent census and QNHS
data are reasonably accurate, then the index suggests that rents may have
been higher in the past than the census suggests, which in turn implies even
higher returns on residential property: thus the conclusions drawn from Table
3 are reinforced.
All of these factors go some way to explaining Bacon’s observation (1998,
p. 9) that “the fact remains that there is a clear preference for home ownership
as compared with other forms of tenure”. Much commentary on the housing
market has focused on public policy. However, as Bacon notes, the degree of
fiscal privilege has narrowed recently, yet the preference for ownership
remains.
2.7 Historical Factors
In exploring the allocation of a long-lived capital good such as housing,
current choices at the margin are only part of the story. Of major relevance are
two historical developments that predate the foundation of the state. First,
there is the series of Land Acts, beginning in the 1880s and continuing into the
1920s, of which the most significant were perhaps the Land Acts of 190323 and
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21 Rent data for 2003 in the Quarterly National Household Survey are consistent with the census
for 2002.
22 The disparity is not explained by the fact that the index relates only to furnished property.
Neither is it likely to be explained by the variability between each successive census in the
definition of the properties to which the rental data relate, i.e. housing units in 1981 and 1991,
dwellings in 2002.
23 I.e. the Wyndham Act. See Lyons (1979, pp. 218-219).1909. Cumulatively, that legislation established owner occupation as the basis
of land tenure in rural Ireland. Over time, landlords were bought out, and
tenant farmers became owner occupiers. By 1961, the share of owner occupiers
in the rural housing stock had reached 77 per cent, twice the urban figure of
38 per cent, and while by 2002 the gap had narrowed, rural owner occupation,
at 87 per cent, remained significantly higher than the urban proportion of 72
per cent.
Second, the decline of the urban private-rented sector and the rise of
urban owner occupation was in large part the unintended long-term
consequence of the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (War Restrictions)
Act, 1915. This was passed in conditions of wartime emergency to protect
urban tenants from the effect of housing shortages and inflation, but it
established a system of rent control that, for a small number of tenants, has
not yet completely disappeared. The original act placed very tight controls on
rents, with a high degree of security of tenure. In consequence much of the
affected property was subsequently allowed to decay, any expansion of private
letting was discouraged, and when a landlord gained vacant possession of a
rented property there was every incentive to transfer it to owner occupation. 
In broad terms, the system established in 1915 remained in place until the
early 1980s for unfurnished lettings of pre-1941 properties of low rateable
value, by which time the primary statute was the Rent Restrictions Act, 1960.
In 1981 certain provisions of the 1960 act were found to be unconstitutional.
Pre-1982 tenants of rent-controlled properties, and their spouses, retain the
protection of the Housing (Private Rented Dwellings) Acts, 1982 and 1983, and
members of their families who succeeded to a controlled tenancy during 1982-
2002 (“successor tenants”) may retain some protection under the Landlord
and Tenant Act, 1980.24 However, the number of such tenancies is small and
declining and is a subset of the 26,000 private unfurnished lettings
(accounting for 18 per cent of all private lettings and 2 per cent of the stock of
dwellings) that were recorded in the 2002 Census. According to Norris and
Winston (2005, p. 66) about 1,700 formerly rent-controlled dwellings retain the
protection of the 1982 Act.
The Finance Act, 1981 introduced the “Section 23” incentives for investors
in residential property. This was the first example since 1922 of a government
policy designed to stimulate the supply of residential property for renting, and
according to Bacon et al. (1998 p.18). “Since 1991 there is evidence of some
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24 For formerly rent-controlled dwellings, the Housing (Private Rented Dwellings) Acts, 1982 and
1983 confer security of tenure on pre-1982 tenants or their spouses, and rents are set by the Rent
Tribunal. The position of a successor tenant is more complex. Protection under the Acts of 1982
and 1983 expired in 2002. A successor tenant may have the right to claim a 35-year (and in effect
perpetual) tenancy through the courts under the Landlord and Tenant Act, (1980).increase taking place in the private rented market, especially in Dublin.” The
2002 census confirms this: in 1991-2002, while total dwellings increased by 25
per cent, privately-let dwellings rose by 75 per cent.
Because of the decline in private letting in the twentieth century, which
began to turn in the 1980s but was not clearly reversed either absolutely or
proportionately until after the 1991 census, the age structure of the rented
and owner-occupied stocks are very different, as Figure 5 illustrates. The
privately-let stock contains a larger proportion of pre-1941 dwellings; post war
expansion and replacement up to 1980 was predominantly of owner-occupied
dwellings, and within the owner-occupied stock over 40 per cent of the total
dates from 1941-1979. Finally, the recent turnaround in the rental market is
shown by the large fraction of total lettings, nearly 50 per cent, that have been
built since 1980.
2.8 Owner Occupation and Affordability
We have seen that there have been powerful forces working to promote
owner occupation, including historical, legal and institutional factors, and
factors involving market forces interacting with the fiscal system. Despite all
of that, the propensity to choose owner occupation could be thwarted if it was












Figure 5: Age Profiles of Owner Occupied and Privately Rented Dwelling
Stocks, 2002
Source: Census of Population, 2002. Based on 97 per cent of households after excluding the “'not
stated” category.not in some sense “affordable”. A simple measure of affordability is given by a
comparison of the cost of servicing a mortgage, versus the cost of renting. This
may be seen as reflecting the viewpoint of a purchaser who, through financial
pressure or myopia, discounts the potential capital gains from house-purchase
and focuses only on immediate cash flows, disregarding any tax
considerations.
We take as our standard the cost of servicing a 20-year variable-rate
mortgage on an average new house, using the same house-price data as before.
If we take the census data on average private rents for 1981, 1991 and 2002,
and QNHS data for 2003, we find that average debt-servicing charges were
about six times average rents in 1981, about three times in 1991, and about
1.8 times in 2002-3. Although house prices have risen dramatically since 1981,
rents have increased as well, while nominal interest rates have tumbled, and
the data for debt service/rents indicate a significant improvement in
affordability.
According to our measure of affordability house purchase has been
relatively more expensive than renting, although it has become less so over
time, but this has not inhibited rising levels and (until very recently) rising
rates of owner occupation. If we base “affordability” comparisons on QNHS
rental data for 2003, with earlier and later years deduced from the CSO’s
Privately Owned Rent Index, then the picture is different, and in fact more
stable, but still indicates that buying has been more expensive than renting.
From 1976 to 2005, debt-servicing costs were on average 1.5 times rents, with
a standard deviation of only 0.3 times. In only two years (1976-77) was buying
cheaper; in four years the multiple reached 2.0 or more, but while two of these
(2004-5) were during the current housing boom, the other two were the peak
years for nominal interest rates, 1981 and 1982.
III TENURE CHOICES AND THE STOCK OF DWELLINGS
The composition of total savings and investment may be unduly affected
by the prevalence of owner occupation, with some displacement of investment
and economic activity from sectors other than housing. (NESC, forward to
Blackwell 1988, p. 8.)
Does the tenure structure in fact affect the share of the capital stock
accounted for by housing, as this passage speculates? Some households may
see their options as being either to rent a small property (e.g. an apartment)
or to buy a larger one (e.g. a house), in which case tenure choices may affect
the level of capital formation in housing. However, in other cases households
may contemplate obtaining a given residential requirement either from owner
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influence the size of the dwelling stock: in such cases, the only issue is the
pattern of ownership of given assets. Before about 1990 there is no evidence
that Ireland’s exceptional tenure structure was associated with exceptional
levels of dwelling stock. At least as long ago as 1980 Ireland had the smallest
number of dwellings in the EU relative to population, and up to 1990 new
completions relative to population were at or somewhat above the EU median.
Investment in dwellings as a share of gross fixed capital formation began the
1980s below the EU median and ended the decade at the median value of 23
per cent. During the 1990s, housing investment in Ireland accelerated. From
1995, Ireland and Germany shared the first and second places when ranked
by the ratio gross investment in dwellings/gross capital formation, but of
course Germany’s record was affected by the reconstruction of the former
DDR. By 2003, this ratio reached 43 per cent for Ireland, and at 32 per cent
Germany was the only other EU-15 country exceeding 30 per cent.25
In 1995, gross investment in dwellings stood at 5.4 per cent of GDP in
Ireland, which was well within one standard deviation of the unweighted
average figure for the EU-15. By 1997 it was above that threshold, and from
1999 Ireland has been above the range for the other fourteen countries in the
EU-15.26
Clearly it is only since the mid-1990s that investment in housing has been
particularly high, relative to GDP, by EU standards. This has been a process
of catching-up with the rest of the EU-15, but it nevertheless remained the
case in 2002-2003, as Figure 6 illustrates, that Ireland had the lowest level of
dwelling provision in the EU-15 relative to population. This was not a
consequence of relatively rapid population growth outflanking housing
construction: in fact it reflects the low base from which growth of the dwelling
stock has proceeded. Even if the Irish population had not grown at all during
1991-2002, then the existing dwelling stock in 2002-2003 would still have been
among the lowest in the EU-15, relative to population. Moreover, despite
recent reductions, Ireland has the largest average household size of all EU
countries, with the possible exception of Spain; it has the smallest per centage
of one-or two-person households, except for Greece, Portugal and Spain, and
the largest proportion of households of five or more persons. 
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25 The summary figures presented here draw on Housing Statistics in the European Union 2004,
Tables 3.2 and 3.9 and 2002, Table 1.13, National Income and Expenditure 2005, Table 15, and
World Bank online data.
26 For reasons that are well-known, it would be preferable to use GNP rather than GDP as the
basis of these comparisons, but EU data are based on GDP. In recent years the replacement of
GDP with GNP, in any ratio such as Investment/GDP, will raise Ireland’s relative position in any
international ranking.IV CONCLUSIONS
The high incidence of owner occupation has a number of sources. The user
cost of housing has been low and usually negative and the microeconomics of
the tenure decision have tended to favour owner occupation. However the
reasons for that go beyond considerations of fiscal incentives: portfolio
considerations also make house-purchase an attractive choice. Historical
factors relating to land tenure and to landlord and tenant legislation are a
further part of the explanation of the level of owner occupation. Although the
level of owner occupation is exceptional, the size of the housing stock relative
to population is not, and in 2002-3 Ireland was still in last place in this respect
within the EU-15.
Tenure patterns have a strong life-cycle dimension, with the proportion of
owner occupiers rising with age across the age spectrum as age rises. As each
cohort ages, the incidence of owner occupation rises, and renting is
concentrated among the young, particularly  those aged 20 to 34. 
In a neutral tax regime user cost would equal reservation rent. The latter
has frequently been negative, as we have seen, as indeed has the measure 
R − c, which is the appropriate expression for user cost and reservation rent in
the absence of tax effects; in particular this is the appropriate measure of user
cost at the margin for purchasers using debt finance who have exhausted the


















Figure 6: Dwellings per 1,000 Population: EU-15, 2002-2003
Source: Housing Statistics in the European Union 2004. Data for 2003 except: LU, FR 2002; FI,
EL 2001; UK 2000; IT 1995.allowable interest deduction. From all of this it might appear that user cost
would be negative even under a neutral tax regime, or under one in which no
mortgage interest was deductible. This would not be a valid conclusion,
because such regime changes would affect the growth of property prices.
It is important not to extrapolate from the evidence presented here into
the future, without considerable caution. Consider an intending purchaser in
the 1990s who based his calculations on the then-current growth rates of
property prices. As we have seen, such a purchaser would have perceived a
significant incentive to buy rather than rent, and ex post that would have
turned out to be a correct conclusion. However, it would be dangerous for
policymakers or indeed for individual purchasers to base decisions for the
future on current values of user cost, based on ex post capital appreciation. In
the past, expectations based on ex post capital appreciation would have
performed well, but under current uncertainties much more research is
needed on how expectations are in fact formulated.
REFERENCES
BACON, PETER and ASSOCIATES, in association with Fergal McCabe and Anthony
Murphy, 1998. An Economic Assessment of Recent House Price Developments,
Dublin: The Stationery Office.
BLACKWELL, JOHN, 1988. A Review of Housing Policy, Dublin: National Economic
and Social Council, Report number 87.
CENTRAL STATISTICS OFFICE, 1946 to 2002. Census, Dublin: The Stationery Office.
Particularly the Housing volumes: 1946 Volume IV Part I, 1961 Volume VI, 1971
volume VI, 1981 Volume 8, 1991 Volume 10, 2002 Volume 13.
CENTRAL STATISTICS OFFICE 2000. Quarterly National Household Survey:
Housing and Households Module, 3rd Quarter 1998, Dublin: The Stationery Office.
CENTRAL STATISTICS OFFICE 2004. Quarterly National Household Survey:
Housing Module, 3rd Quarter 2003, Dublin: The Stationery Office.
CENTRAL STATISTICS OFFICE, 2006. National Income and Expenditure 2005,
Dublin: The Stationery Office.
COMMISSION ON TAXATION, 1982. First Report of the Commission on Taxation,
Dublin: The Stationery Office.
DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT, HERITAGE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, Quarterly and Annual. Housing Statistics Bulletin, Dublin: The
Stationery Office. Originally published by the Department of Local Government,
under the title Quarterly Bulletin of Housing Statistics.
DRUDY, P. J. and MICHAEL PUNCH, 2005. Out of Reach, Dublin: tasc at New Island.
GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND, 1960. Rent Restrictions Act,  1960, Dublin: The
Stationery Office.
GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND, 1980. Landlord and Tenant Act, 1980, Dublin: The
Stationery Office.
GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND, 1981. Finance Act, 1981, Dublin: The Stationery
Office.
130 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEWGOVERNMENT OF IRELAND, 1982. Housing (Private Rented Dwellings) Act, 1982,
Dublin: The Stationery Office.
GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND, 1983. Housing (Private Rented Dwellings) Act, 1983,
Dublin: The Stationery Office.
GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND, ANNUAL. Budget, Dublin: The Stationery Office.
Housing Statistics in the European Union 2002. Initiated by the Department of
Housing of the Direction General of Planning, Housing and Heritage of the
Walloon Region of Belgium. Available from http://mrw.wallonie.be/dgatlp/
HousingStats [accessed March 2004].
Housing Statistics in the European Union 2004. Edited by the National Board of
Housing, Building and Planning, Sweden, and Ministry for Regional Development
of the Czech Republic. Available from http://www.boverket.se [accessed March
2005].
LYONS, F. S. L., 1979. Ireland Since the Famine, 6th impression, London: Collins/
Fontana.
MCCASHIN, ANTHONY, 2000. The Private Rented Sector in the 21st Century: Policy
Choices, Dublin: Threshold.
MEMERY, CLODAGH, 2000. “Foreward”, in McCashin,The Private Rented Sector in
the 21st Century: Policy Choices, Dublin: Threshold, pp. vii-x.
NORRIS, MICHELLE and NESSA WINSTON, 2005. Housing Policy Review 1990-
2002, Dublin: The Stationery Office, for the Department of the Environment,
Heritage and Local Government,
THE REVENUE COMMISSIONERS, ANNUAL. Annual Report of the Revenue
Commissioners, Dublin: The Stationery Office.
THE REVENUE COMMISSIONERS, ANNUAL. Statistical Report of the Revenue
Commissioners, Dublin: The Stationery Office.
WATSON, DOROTHY and JAMES WILLIAMS, 2003. Irish National Survey of
Housing Quality, Dublin: The Economic and Social Research Institute, for the
Department of the Environment.
WHELAN, SHANE, undated. From Canals to Computers: The Friends First Guide to
Long-Term Investment in Ireland, Dublin: Friends First Asset Management.
Augmented by later data supplied to the author by Dr Whelan.
WORLD BANK GROUP, 2005. World Development Indicators, available from
http://devdata.worldbank.orh/dataonline/ [accessed October 2005.]
HOUSING TENURE IN IRELAND 131APPENDIX A
Consider a property initially worth V0, appreciating in value at the annual
rate c. The rate of interest on property loans is R, and the rates of income tax
and capital gains tax are ty and tc respectively. The property may be owned and
let by a landlord, or alternatively it may be owner occupied. In either case
assume that a portion E of the total value is held as equity. Assume that R is
also the opportunity cost of equity in property.
For a landlord, the rate λ of reservation rent is determined by equalising
the after-tax return from investing in property with the return from investing
in an alternative asset. 
Then (1 − ty)(λV0 − R(V0 − E))+(1 − tc)cV0=(1 − ty)RE, so that the rate of
reservation rent is
λ=R−(1−tc)c/(1−ty) (A1)
Currently in Ireland, tc = 0.2. For individual taxpayers who are chargeable
at the lower rate of income tax, ty = 0.2 also, so that λ = R − c. This is an upper
bound for λ: for individual taxpayers who are liable to the higher rate of
income tax, ty = 0.42 in 2006 and λ = R − 1.38c (or  in 2007, ty = 0.41 and
λ = R − 1.36c), while for corporate landlords, ty = 0.25 and λ = R − 1.07c.
If interest were not deductible for tax purposes, then (1 − ty)V0λ' − R(V0 −
E) + (1 − tc)cV0 = (1 − ty)RE, so that the rate of reservation rent would be
λ' = R/(1 − ty) − (1 − tc)c/(1 − ty) − tyRE/V0(1 − ty) (A2)
This was the position in Ireland from April 1998 until December 2001, and
the impact of this policy may be seen as follows:
λ' − λ = R/(1 − ty) − tyRE/V0(1 − ty) − R = [Rty/(1 − ty)][1 − E/V0], which is
positive, assuming that E < V0. Thus, as might be expected, the reservation
rent rises when interest is disallowed as a deduction.
For a purchaser, we start with the most comprehensive definition of
taxable income, where imputed rent at the rate   from owner occupation is
subject to income tax, interest payments are deductible, and capital gains are
taxed, so that user cost equals the (gross) interest cost plus taxation (which
reflects interest deductibility), reduced by the net-of-tax rate of capital gain.
Thus u = R + ty(  − R) − (1 − tc)c. If   is set equal to the rate of reservation
rent λ, as in (A1) above, then 
u1 = R + ty[R − (1 − tc)c/(1 − ty)) − R] − (1 − tc)c 
= R − (1 − tc)c[ty/(1 − ty) +1] = R − (1 − tc)c/(1 − ty) = λ (A3)
132 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEWWhen interest is deductible for tax purposes, but imputed rental income
and capital gains are untaxed, which is the current position in Ireland for a
principal private residence on a site of no more than one acre, then
u2 = (1 − ty)R − c. (A4)
Finally, if capital gains tax were imposed on private residences, without
taxation of imputed rents, then c should be replaced in (A4) by (1 − tc)c.
Taking the expressions (A1) and (A4) for reservation rent and user cost, we
may show that:
if u2 > 0 then λ >u 2. This follows from the fact that multiplying u2 by 1/(1 − ty),
which exceeds 1, we have R − c/(1 − ty) which must exceed u2, given u2 > 0, and
then
λ = R − (1 − tc)c/(1 − ty) > R − c/(1−ty)>u 2.
It is also the case that if λ > 0 then λ >u 2: multiplying λ by (1 − ty) gives
us (1 − ty)R − (1 − tc)c, which must be less that λ, and then u2 = (1 − ty)R − c <
(1 − ty)R − (1 − tc)c < λ. However, notice that while u2 > 0 ⇒ λ > 0, the converse
does not hold.
If λ equals R − c exactly or approximately (e.g. if ty is the standard rate 
of income tax or the rate of corporation tax, at current values), then 
u2 = (1 − ty)R – c < R − c = λ always, i.e. whether λ is positive or negative.
We may extend this analysis formally to a multi-period context by
equating the present value of rents (or imputed rents) plus capital gains to the
initial value of a property, over a given time interval [0,T]. Holding constant
the rate of interest, the tax structure and the time horizon, we assume that
reservation rents vary in proportion to capital value so that for landlords we
must find a scalar λ such that, where r is the discount rate,
T
− V0 + V0e(c−r)T − (V0ecT − V0)tce−rT + (1 − ty)λV0e(c−r)t dt = 0 (A5)
0
The solution for λ is the rate of reservation rent. Alternatively, setting 
ty = 0 (i.e. no tax on imputed rent) and replacing λ with u we have the
corresponding expression for the owner occupier:
T
−V0 + V0e(c−r)T − (V0ecT − V0)tce−rT + uV0 e(c−r)t dt = 0 (A6)
0
HOUSING TENURE IN IRELAND 133If interest payments are deductible, we set the discount rate r equal to 
R(1 − ty); otherwise r = R.
Taking the definite integral and rearranging, we have:
c – r  1 – e(c–r)T + tc(ecT – 1)e–rT
λ = ––––  ––––––––––––––––––––– (for the moment assuming that c ≠ r),
1 – ty e(c–r)T – 1
= +  tc  . By expanding the exponentials out to the
linear terms,  may be approximated by c/(c−r) when T is small, in
which case we have as before:
λ = +  =   − c for landlords, or u = r − (1 − tc)c for
owner occupiers, where in either case r equals (1 − ty)R if interest at the rate
R is deductible for income tax purposes, and r = R otherwise. In the case of
deductibility, and with capital gains tax levied only on landlords we again
have 
λ = R − c and u2 = (1 − ty)R − c.
When T is large and the first-order approximations to the exponentials are
invalid, we have to consider the term  . If c >  r it is clear from
inspecting the graph of ex that  > 1. Alternatively if c < r,  < 0.
In either case  tc  >0, and the existence of capital gains taxes
raises the reservation rent. The corresponding expression for owner occupiers
is obtained by setting ty=0, and this also is raised.
Finally, we must consider the case c = r. Equation (A5) reduces to
T
−1 + 1− (1 − e−rT)tc + (1 − ty)λ dt =0, from which λ =  > 0, 
0
whereas in this case user cost is zero. The latter may be found by solving (A6)
after setting c = r. Again, we have user cost less than the rate of reservation
rent.
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